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Constitutional Law-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: A NEW EXCEPTION
TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT-New York v. Ferber, 50 U.S.L.W.
5077 (U.S. July 2, 1982)
"The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a governmental objective of surpassing importance."'
I. INTRODUCTION
After cautious beginnings in the late 1960's, "kiddie porn" burst
upon the pornography market and the front pages in the mid-
1970's.1 As the country became aware of this multimillion dollar,
nationwide industry,3 Congress and state legislatures hurriedly en-
acted tough penal legislation to combat the problem. Today the
federal government and forty-seven states have statutes specifi-
cally directed at preventing the production of child pornography
while thirty-five states and the United States Congress have
passed legislation prohibiting the distribution of such materials.4
At least half of the statutes aimed at preventing production do not
require that the materials be legally obscene and twenty states
prohibit the distribution of child pornography without requiring
that the material be legally obscene."
The constitutionality of these various statutes has rarely been
challenged in the courts. The laws prohibiting the production and
distribution of legally obscene child pornography are unquestion-
ably constitutional' so long as they do not suffer from the fatal
1. New York v. Ferber, 50 U.S.L.W. 5077, 5080 (U.S. July 2, 1982).
2. Comment, Preying on Playgrounds: The Sexploitation of Children in Pornography
and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDiNE L. Rzv. 809, 810 (1978).
3. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 40, 42.
Robin Lloyd, the author of For Money or Love: Boy Prostitution in America, has
documented the existence of over 260 different magazines which depict children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct....
Such magazines depict children, some as young as three to five years of age, in
couplings with their peers of the same and opposite sex, or with adult men and
women. The activities featured range from lewd poses to intercourse, fellatio, cun-
nilingus, masturbation, rape, incest and sado-masochism.
Such magazines, however, are only one of the forms of child pornography that
are currently available in the United States. Other forms include ten to twelve
minute films known as "loops", still photographs, slides, playing cards, and video
cassettes.
Id. at 43.
4. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5078.
5. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5078 & n.2. By this is meant legally obscene as defined by the test in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
6. The constitutionality of obscene child pornography statutes could be adjudged by the
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flaws of vagueness and/or overbreadth. However, the statutes sup-
pressing child pornography without a requirement of legal obscen-
ity have experienced mixed reviews in state and federal courts.
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case of New York v. Ferber, it had to face squarely the issue of the
constitutionality of state statutes regulating nonobscene child
pornography.
The significance of the Ferber decision lies in the Supreme
Court's holding that the traditional first amendment test for ob-
scenity would not be applied to child pornography statutes because
of the overriding state interest in protecting the welfare of chil-
dren. This state interest was determined to be compelling enough
to overcome the first amendment arguments against the child por-
nography statutes.'
This note will deal with a general background of United States
Supreme Court obscenity decisions as well as the Court's tradi-
tional concern for the welfare of children in this area. Then it will
concentrate on the Ferber case, taking it from the trial court,
through the state appeal courts and, up to the United States Su-
preme Court. This note will not delve into the history or details of
child pornography because the subject has been amply covered
elsewhere.' 0
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has held that "[1]iberty of speech, and of
the press, is . . . not an absolute right, and the State may punish
its abuse."'" The first amendment prohibition that "Congress shall
make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech"'" has not been
interpreted by the Court to cover all speech. Exceptions have been
Miller test without problems. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1981) (constitutional); Payne v. Com-
monwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981) (constitutional). But see, e.g., Graham v. Hill, 444 F.
Supp. 584 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (unconstitutional); People v. Ferber, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981)
(unconstitutional).
8. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5079.
9. Id. at 5080.
10. See generally Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model
Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 536-45 (1981); Comment, supra note 2, at 810-20; Com-
ment, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and En-
forceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 296-304 (1979); Note, Child Pornography
Legislation, 17 J FAM. L. 505, 506-11 (1979); Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the
Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 711, 713-16.
11. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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recognized for various categories of speech which do not warrant
first amendment protections.
There was little litigation regarding the scope and meaning of
the first amendment until the early 1900's."3 Once the Court began
to examine the first amendment, however, it quickly deemed cer-
tain categories of speech to be unprotected. In wartime, a claim for
first amendment protection is necessarily diminished. " "Fighting
words" and libel have also been declared as unprotected speech.15
By far obscenity has been the most difficult exception for the
court."' The Court established these exceptions to first amendment
protection because "such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' 7
The Court's difficulty with obscenity derives from the attempt to
define the term. 8 Dicta in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"9 sug-
gested that lewdness and obscenity could be prevented and pun-
ished without raising constitutional problems. The terms "lewd-
ness" and "obscenity" were fiot defined in Chaplinsky, however,
and it was fifteen years until the case of Roth v. United States20
before the Court first established a definition.2 1 Following Roth,
the Court could not muster a majority to agree upon the definition
of obscenity until the case of Miller v. California.22 In the interim,
13. P. KAUPER & F. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1151 (5th ed. 1980).
14. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). At one time commercial
speech was also excluded from first amendment protection, but now it is protected. These
exceptions have recently been narrowly construed. See M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 344-46 (5th ed. 1979); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
12-10 at 618 (1978).
16. See infra notes 18-53 and accompanying text.
17. 315 U.S. at 572 (footnote omitted).
18. Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), remarked
that obscenity may be indefinable but "I know it when I see it."
19. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
20. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21. The test adopted was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
22. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 46 (1976). Miller was
convicted under the California penal code for knowingly distributing obscene matter. 413
U.S. at 16. Under the prior case of, A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966), a plurality of the
Court stated a three-part definition of obscenity:
(a) [t]he dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contempo-
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the Court began the practice "of per curiam reversals of convic-
tions for the dissemination of materials that at least five members
of the Court, applying their separate tests, deemed not to be
obscene."2
In Miller, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated
that "[t]his much has been categorically settled by the Court, that
obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment. '24 Bur-
ger, writing for himself and four other members of the Court, held:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether
"the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.25
The Miller decision is still good law today and, conceivably,
should be applied to all prohibitions and punishments of obscene
materials. However, the Court has carved out exceptions to the ob-
scenity doctrine, one of which is in the case of juveniles. The Court
has held that even where there is an invasion of protected free-
doms "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader
than over like actions of adults."26
Under the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
"the general power to enact rules for the health, safety, welfare
and morals of the people belongs to the States. '2 7 The protection
of minors is part of this power and is subject to regulation by the
states. Two aspects of child welfare which are heavily regulated by
the states are school attendance and employment. The Court has
declared that it "goes without saying" that states have the power
rary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
23. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). "No fewer than 31 cases have been disposed of in this fashion." Id. at 82
n.8.
24. 413 U.S. at 23.
25. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
26. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). The stated purpose of this greater
power is that "[a) democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens." Id.
27. Herzog, The Protection of Minors in Labor Law, 26 AMER. J. CoMP. L. 293, 293
(Supp. 1978).
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to prohibit the employment of workers under a certain age.28
In Prince v. Massachusetts,2' the Court upheld a state child la-
bor law over first amendment objections. A Massachussetts statute
forbade boys under twelve and girls under eighteen to sell
magazines or newspapers in any street or public place.30 The de-
fendant was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses and took her ward
with her to sell religious newspapers on the public streets."1 She
was subsequently arrested for violating the child labor law. At
trial, her defense was that the statute was an unconstitutional vio-
lation of her niece's freedom of religion under the first amendment,
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and a vi-
olation of her parental rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.3 2
In considering the defense, the Court held that "[a]gainst these
sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests
of society to protect the welfare of children."3 3 The Court reasoned
that the whole community has an interest in keeping children safe
from abuses and giving them the opportunity to grow into free and
independent well-developed persons and citizens.3 4 Acting to guard
the general interest in the well-being of children, "the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and
in many other ways."36 The Court held that the state's power over
the welfare of children extends to matters of conscience and reli-
gious conviction. 6 The Court concluded that the power of the state
to control the public proclaiming of religion by children reaches
beyond the scope of its authority over adults, "as is true in the
case of other freedoms. '3 7
Thus, the state was able to counterbalance the defendant's first
amendment rights by upholding the compelling state interest in
protecting the welfare of children. The Court left open the possi-
bility that states could apply this rationale to prevail over first
amendment rights in other situations.
28. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587, 593 (1929).
29. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
30. Id. at 160-61.
31. Id. at 159-60.
32. Id. at 164.
33. Id. at 165.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 167.
37. Id. at 170.
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The Court used this rationale in Roe v. Wade"' to overcome a
woman's constitutional right of privacy in her choice of whether or
not to have an abortion after the fetus had reached the stage at
which it could be viable on its own. Texas law made it a crime to
"procure an abortion," or to attempt one, except on medical advice
to save the mother's life.39 In holding this statute unconstitutional,
the Court stated that the constitutional right of privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy. "40 However, "at some point the state interests
as to protection of . . .prenatal life become dominant."' 1 The
point at which the "State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life" becomes compelling is at viability.42 Thus, the state
"may go so far as to proscribe abortion" after viability is reached.'
The Court also declared that the state's interest in the welfare of
children could outweigh personal freedoms in Bellotti v. Baird.44
Bellotti concerned a Massachusetts statute that required a preg-
nant minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of her par-
ents or to obtain judicial approval following refusal by one of her
parents.45 Even though the Court found the statute too restrictive
in that it unconstitutionally burdened the right of the pregnant
minor to seek an abortion," the Court held that states may limit
the freedom of children to make affirmative choices that have po-
tentially serious consequences. 47 States are permitted this power
because "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to rec-
ognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." 48
In a decision relying heavily upon Prince,49 the Court in Gins-
berg v. New York 50 affirmed a conviction under "a New York crim-
inal obscenity statute which prohibits the sale to minors under 17
years of age, of material defined to be obscene on the basis of its
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Id. at 117-18.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 155.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id.
44. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
45. Id. at 625-26.
46. Id. at 651.
47. Id. at 635.
48. Id. (footnote omitted).
49. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
50. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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appeal to them, whether or not it would be obscene to adults.""1
The Court stated that "even where there is an invasion of pro-
tected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.' ",52
The basis of this power is that "the State has an interest 'to pro-
tect the welfare of children' and to see that they are 'safeguarded
from abuses.' ,53
With a definite standard of obscenity and an exception to that
standard for the state to further protect children, the stage was set
for the rise of child pornography and the legislative attack upon
these materials. The ascent of the Ferber case from the trial court
to the United States Supreme Court, and the numerous opinions it
has left in its wake, is a graphic depiction of the struggle to combat
the evils of child pornography and still attempt to maintain the
viability of the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and press.
III. THE CASE AGAINST PAUL IRA FERBER
In 1977, the New York state legislature amended the state penal
code and added a child pornography provision.54 The new statute
51. Id. at 631.
52. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 170).
53. Id. at 640 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978); Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57.
54. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263 (McKinney 1977):
§ 263.00 Definitions:
As used in this article the following definitions shall apply:
1. "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof which
includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.
2. "Obscene sexual performance" means any performance which in-
cludes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age in any mate-
rial which is obscene, as such term is defined in section 235.00 of this
chapter.
3. "Sexual conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, devi-
ate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic
abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.
4. "Performance" means any play, motion picture, photograph or dance.
Performance also means any other visual representation exhibited before an
audience.
5. "Promote" means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide,
lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, dis-
seminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same.
§ 263.10 Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child.
A person is guilty of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child when,
knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any
19831 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
established tough sanctions against promoting a sexual perform-
ance by a child.5 Section 263.15 prohibits the promotion of a sex-
ual performance by a child under the age of sixteen even if it was
not legally obscene.
Paul Ira Ferber, the owner/operator of a Manhattan bookstore
specializing in sexually oriented products, was arrested for selling
two films, which Ferber depicted as "Kiddie Films" to an under-
cover policeman.56 He was indicted for two violations each of sec-
tion 263.10 and section 263.15 of the New York penal law.5 7 At
trial Ferber moved to dismiss the indictments on federal constitu-
tional grounds.5 " In finding both sections of the statute constitu-
tional, New York Court of Appeals Justice Irving Lang stated that
"[tihe well-being of children is a subject long recognized as within
a state's constitutional power to regulate, particularly in relation to
sexual matters," possibly allowing the state to "restrict what other-
wise would be constitutionally protected conduct."59 Justice Lang
obscene performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen
years of age.
Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony.
§ 263.15 Promoting a sexual performance by a child.
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing
the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any perform-
ance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.
Promoting a sexual performance by a child is a class D felony.
55. Id. §§ 263.10-.15. The constitutionality of § 263.15 was challenged in St. Martin's
Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), when the publisher and distributors
of Show Me!, a book made and photographed in Germany for parents to use in educating
their children about sex and which included photographs of naked children, brought suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the section. Id. at 1198-99. The
court held Show Me! not to be obscene under Miller and that there was a serious question
as to the facial constitutionality of § 263.15. Id. at 1204-05. The defendants were enjoined
pendente lite from enforcing the section against Show Me! Id. at 1208. The order was re-
versed in St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1979), because the case
did not "involve a case or controversy which justifies intervention by a federal court."
56. People v. Ferber, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The films were ten minutes
in duration, "one depicting a boy masturbating, the other a group of boys engaging in sexual
conduct." Id. at 637.
57. These offenses are punishable as class D felonies, see supra note 54, which carry a
maximum imprisonment for up to seven years as to individuals, and as to corporations a
fine of up to $10,000. N.Y. PENAL LAWS §§ 70.00, 80.10 (McKinney 1975).
58. Ferber implied that "the very fabric of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution ...would be shredded by upholding" the statute which
he claimed was "overly broad, vague, irrational, arbitrary, serves no legitimate state interest,
is penally excessive and violates the doctrine of equal protection of the laws." 409 N.Y.S.2d
at 635.
59. Id. The court cited the United States Supreme Court cases of Ginsberg, Prince,
Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
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found the legislative purpose of section 263.10 to protect children60
to be valid, reasonable and rational.61 However, section 263.15
posed greater constitutional difficulties for Lang.
The intent of the legislature in passing section 263.15 was to
prohibit a sexual performance by a child even if the performance is
within a constitutionally protected context.62 Thus, under the stat-
ute, even in a work of obvious literary, artistic or scientific merit, a
sexual performance by a child would be prohibited." The court
balanced the right of freedom of expression against the right of the
legislature to protect children against sexual exploitation and
found the scale tipped in favor of the latter. The court noted that
"the likelihood that children performing sexual intercourse or
lewdly exhibiting their genitals would constitute an important part
of a performance is highly remote. ' 6 4 Lang found alternatives
available for literary and artistic performances that called for the
use of children performing sexual activities. Two alternatives sug-
gested were using a juvenile over sixteen who looked younger, and
simulation outside of the prohibitions of the statute.6 5
60. "The purpose is 'To eliminate the sexual exploitation of children by establishing
strict criminal sanctions against individuals who induce children to participate in sexual
performances and who profit from the distribution of such material."' 409 N.Y.S.2d at 636
(quoting Memorandum in Support A-3587-B, Assemblyman Lasher).
The legislature set forth its intent in the Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 910, 1977 N.Y. Laws
1901:
Section 1. Legislative declaration. The legislature finds that there has been a
proliferation of exploitation of children as subjects in sexual performances. The
care of children is a sacred trust and should not be abused by those who seek to
profit through a commercial network based upon the exploitation of children. The
public policy of the state demands the protection of children from exploitation
through sexual performances.
The legislature further finds that the sale of these movies, magazines and photo-
graphs depicting the sexual conduct of children to be so abhorrent to the fabric of
our society that it urges law enforcement officers to aggressively seek out and
prosecute both the peddlers of children and the promoters of this filth by vigor-
ously applying the sanctions contained in this act.
61. 409 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
62. "In essence this Article would make material containing children in sexual perform-
ances, no matter what the purpose, against the public policy of the state." Id. at 637 (quot-
ing Memorandum in Support A-3587-B, Assemblyman Lasher) (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. Id. But see S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 40, 49-50, in which it was stated that "the film 'The Exorcist'
contains a brief scene in which a minor simulates masturbation" and "the film 'Romeo and
Juliet' contains a brief scene in which a minor appears in the nude." Under the New York
statute both of these films would be prohibited and their producers, distributors and exhibi-
tors open to convictions with a penalty of up to seven years in prison.
65. 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637. But see infra note 95.
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Justice Lang logically reasoned that "it would seed [sic] anoma-
lous for the state to be able to prohibit the employment of a child
under sixteen from working as a stagehand but be prevented from
prohibiting the use of that child to engage in sexual intercourse on
stage.""0 A jury subsequently acquitted Ferber of the obscenity
charges under section 263.10, but found him guilty of both counts
of promoting a sexual performance by a child under section
263.15.67
The conviction of Ferber by the Supreme Court of New York
County, was unanimously affirmed without a written opinion by
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. es On ap-
peal to the New York Court of Appeals, however, Ferber's convic-
tion was reversed in a per curiam opinion." The court declared
that the statute is "clearly aimed at books, films and other tradi-
tional forms of free expression" entitled to first amendment pro-
tection and thus suffers from overbreadth. 70 The court recognized
the state's legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of juveniles
within its borders but "[tjo the extent the statute would purport to
regulate the sexual performances of children throughout the world
there is some question as to whether that goal . . .necessarily
comes within the police powers of the State of New York. 7
The court also found the statute "strikingly underinclusive "72 in
that the severe penalties imposed by the statute are reserved for
producers and distributors of nonobscene materials featuring ado-
lescent sex and do not apply to the producers and distributors of
materials "in which a child has performed a dangerous stunt" or
activity "dangerous to the health or well-being" of a child em-
66. 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
67. People v. Ferber, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (1981). Ferber was sentenced to 45 days in
jail. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5079 n.3.
68. People v. Ferber, 74 A.D.2d 558 (N.Y. 1980).
69. The contentions by Ferber on appeal were: (a) § 263.15 is unconstitutional because it
omits the constitutional requirement that a child's sexual performance be obscene; (b) prej-
udicial comments made by the prosecution during the summation denied the defendant his
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments; and (c) the trial
court committed reversible error in shifting the burden of proof when it refused to charge
the jury that the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the players in
the films were under the age of sixteen. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 675 (1981). The Court of Appeals
dealt with only the first contention.
70. 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865, 866. The court's interpretation of the statute to reach books
flies in the face of the language of the statute, since under § 263.00(4) performance is lim-
ited to visual materials, and is contrary to the intent of the legislature. See supra notes 54,
60.
71. 439 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
72. Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214).
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ployee. 7' This is discrimination on the basis of content, according
to the court, "and since no justification has been shown for the
distinction other than special legislative distaste for this type
7 of
material, the statute is unconstitutional.
The granting of certiorari to Ferber's case provided the basis for
the United States Supreme Court's "first examination of a statute
directed at, and limited to depictions of sexual activity involving
children. '7 5 Justice White authored the opinion of the Court which
reversed the New York Court of Appeals.76 White took judicial no-
tice of the nationwide child pornography problem and the federal
and state legislation enacted to combat it.7 7 The Court was per-
suaded that the states are entitled to greater leeway in the regula-
tion of child pornography for five reasons: (a) "a state's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of a minor'
is 'compelling;' "78 (b) "the distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the
sexual abuse of children; e79 (c) the distribution of "child pornogra-
phy provides an economic motive for and is thus an integral part
of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout
the nation;" 80 (d) the value of allowing live or visual performances
of "children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest,
if not de minimis; 8"1 and (e) excluding child pornography from
first amendment protection is not incompatible with the Court's
precedents.8 2
73. Id. However, underinclusive classifications, i.e. those which do not include all who
are similarly situated with respect to a law, are constitutionally invalid only when "the
choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." Mathews
v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
"The state [is] not bound to deal alike with all ... classes, or to strike at all evils at the
same time or in the same way." Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935). See
also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
74. Id.
75. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5079.
76. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined White's
opinion. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens also filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.
77. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5078.
78. Id. at 5080 (quoting Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 50 U.S.L.W. 4759 (U.S.
June 23, 1982)). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
79. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5081.
80. Id. at 5081-82.
81. Id. at 5082.
82. Id.
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In explaining the first reason for upholding the constitutionality
of the New York statute, White declined to second-guess the legis-
lative judgment of New York that "there has been a proliferation
of exploitation of children as subjects in sexual performances. "83
White concluded, from legislative judgment and relevant litera-
ture, that children used in pornography are physiologically, emo-
tionally and mentally harmed by the participation.8 4
Turning to the second justification for upholding the statute,
White declared that there was a link between the distribution of
child pornography and the sexual abuse of children in two ways.
One way is that once a child's sexual performance is reduced to a
permanent visual record, the harm to the child is exacerbated by
the circulation of that record. The second way is that, since pro-
duction of these materials is a low profile, clandestine business, it
is extremely difficult to apprehend the producers, but by closing
the producers' distribution network the economic incentive to pro-
duce these materials will dry up, resulting in a decrease in
production."
The Court acknowledged that the states could set their own
standards for prohibiting obscene child pornography. Nevertheless,
the Court also found that the first amendment does not restrict a
state from prohibiting nonobscene child pornography.86 The Court
compared the test for child pornography to the Miller standard:
[Tihe question under the Miller test of whether a work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of the average person
bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been
physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work. Similarly, a sexually explicit depiction need not be "pa-
tently offensive" in order to have required the sexual exploitation
of a child for its production. In addition, a work which, taken on
the whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child
pornography.87
83. Id. at 5080; 1977 N.Y. Laws 910 See also supra note 60.
84. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5080-81 & n.9.
85. Id. at 5081.
86. Id. at 5081. See id. at 5078 n.2 for those statutes that require material to be found
obscene and those that do not before it can be prohibited.
87. Id. at 5081. The Court rejected the Miller test as follows: "A trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not re-
quired that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the
material at issue need not be considered as a whole." Id. at 5082.
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The Miller test was rejected because the Court decided that it was
not related to the issue of whether a child was abused, mentally or
physically, in the production of pornographic material. Applying
the Miller test to child pornography would not stop child abuse in
this area. A child could be abused and harmed through the produc-
tion of pornographic materials that would be protected speech
under Miller. Thus, the Court reasoned that to prevent the type of
child abuse addressed by the statute in question, the Miller test
would have to be set aside when analyzing a child pornography
statute.88
The dismissal of the Miller standards left the states free to sup-
press child pornography as they saw fit.8' But White quickly put
limits on the regulation of unprotected child pornography. First,
the conduct prohibited must be adequately defined by the lan-
guage of the applicable statute or by the interpretation put on the
statute by the state courts.90 The Court found the New York stat-
ute's prohibitions to be adequately defined as to the work prohib-
ited (visual), the age of the performers (under sixteen), and the
type of sexual conduct (actual or simulated sexual intercourse, de-
viate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomas-
ochistic abuse and lewd exhibition of the genitals). Second, some
element of scienter must be required on the part of the accused. 1
The New York statute required the scienter of "knowing" or
awareness." Third, only live performances or visual reproductions
of live performances are not constitutionally protected. 3 Thus,
written descriptions of the statutorily proscribed activities banned
by a statute are constitutionally protected if they are not obscene.
The Miller test remains applicable to sexual child performances
that are not live or are not visual reproductions of live perform-
ances. This would seem to include books, magazines, pamphlets,
88. Id.
89. State statutes are restricted in their reach by the federal constitution and by the
applicable state constitution. This note will only deal with the restrictions placed upon child
pornography statutes by the federal constitution.
90. Id. at 5082.
91. Id.
92. "A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by
a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that
such circumstance exists." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
93. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5082. But see supra note 70 and accompanying text. It is indeed
perplexing how White could ignore the statutory interpretation put on the statute by the
highest court in the state of New York. Hypothetically, if the statute was used against a
book, as it could under the statutory interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals, then
White's opinion could be used to strike down that use as unconstitutional.
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advertisements and oral recordings. The limiting of these statutes
prohibiting nonobscene child pornography to visual materials is
logical since the purpose of these statutes is to protect the welfare
of children. No child is abused when an author describes the activ-
ities prohibited by the New York statute. Thus, if the purpose of
the statute is to protect children, there would be no reason to pro-
hibit nonobscene, nonvisual material describing the activities listed
in the statute.
In explaining the third justification for upholding the New York
statute, i.e., that distribution of child pornography provides an ec-
onomic motive for the illegal activity of production, the Court de-
clared that the constitutional freedoms of speech and press do not
protect "speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute. '94 Here the Court is allowing
the states to attempt to hinder the producers of child pornography
by disrupting, and hopefully shutting down, their distribution net-
work. If the state cannot punish the elusive producers by criminal
penalties, then the state can economically punish them by drying
up their outlets to the purchasing public.
Justice White's fourth reason for sustaining the New York stat-
ute is that the first amendment value of permitting child pornogra-
phy is modest, if not non-existent. White, echoing the trial court,
observed that "if it were necessary for literary or artistic value" for
a juvenile to engage in sexual conduct "a person over the statutory
age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized."9' Another al-
ternative could be "[s]imulation outside of the prohibition of the
statute."'  The Court's allowance of these alternatives demon-
strates that the purpose of these prohibitions on nonobscene, vis-
ual child pornography is to protect the welfare of children and not
merely an attempt to suppress the nonobscene sexual media in
94. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5082 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949)). Writing cannot be an integral part of a violation of the New York child pornogra-
phy statute in question, since nonobscene writing cannot be constitutionally prohibited
under the statute. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95. Id. The Court does not give its opinion on the constitutionality of state child pornog-
raphy statutes that define a child as a person under age sixteen or who appears as a
prepubescent. Illinois, Nebraska and Indiana have such provisions. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 11-20a (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463 (1979); IND. CODE §§ 35-30-10.1-2 to -3
(1979).
If the statutes are intended to protect minors from the ill effects of engaging in child
pornography, that purpose would not appear to be served by the extended provisions of
these statutes since no minors would be involved. It therefore would seem possible that the
Court would strike down these provisions as overbroad.
96. Id.
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general.
The final justification for upholding the New York law was that
in doing so, the Court followed precedent. The Court regarded the
statute in question as a content-based classification of speech and
thus utilized a balancing test to determine its constitutionality.9 7
The Court found that within the confines of the given classification
of child pornography, the restricted evil of the sexual abuse and
exploitation of children so overwhelmingly outweighs the expres-
sive interests at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication
is required to prove that child abuse occurred in the production of
the material involved in the prosecution.9
Turning to the question of the alleged underinclusiveness of the
statute in question, White held that, since section 263.15 deals
with material not entitled to first amendment protection, there is
nothing unconstitutionally underinclusive about singling out this
category of material for proscription.9 Since child pornography "as
defined in § 263.15 is unprotected speech subject to content-based
regulation,"100 it cannot be underinclusive or unconstitutional for a
state statute to single out child pornography while failing to regu-
late other protected speech which creates the same alleged risk.
This was a direct reference to the language of the New York Court
of Appeals,10' as was the Court's statement that the first amend-
ment does not bar the state from prohibiting the distribution of
unprotected materials produced outside the state. 02
Justice White next focused his attention on the issue of the al-
leged facial overbreadth of the statute. Ferber alleged that because
the statute would forbid the distribution of material with serious
literary, scientific or educational value, or material which does not
threaten the harm sought to be combatted by the state, the statute
is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 03 He won with this
challenge in the New York Court of Appeals, but White found sec-
tion 263.15 to be not "substantially overbroad."' 4
97. Id.
98. Id. But see infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
99. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5083.
100. Id. at 5083 n.18.
101. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
102. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5083. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
103. Even though Ferber's activity could be constitutionally regulated, he could attack
the statute as invalid on its face. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5083 n.21.
104. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5085. A comprehensive review of the overbreadth doctrine is beyond
the scope of this note. For cases discussing facial overbreadth see Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
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The Court has insisted that the facial overbreadth of a statute
must be not only real but also substantial before it is declared un-
constitutional on this basis, especially where conduct and not
merely speech is involved.'05 With the statute in question, White
considered it to be "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose
legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.' 1 6
The prohibition of protected expression which concerned the New
York Court of Appeals, "ranging from medical textbooks to
pictorials in National Geographic, "107 amount to no more than a
tiny fraction of the materials within the state's reach, reasoned
White.10s Whatever overbreadth does exist in section 263.15 should
be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situation. 09
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justice Marshall, con-
curred in the judgment. However, Brennan stressed that the "ap-
plication of § 263.15 or any similar statute to depictions of children
that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, scientific or
medical value, would violate the First Amendment." 10 Brennan
stated that the value of these depictions of children, vis-a-vis the
first amendment, that are themselves serious contributions to art,
literature, or science, is simply not de minimus by definition and
"[a]t the same time, the State's interest in suppression of such
materials is likely to be far less compelling.""' In the absence of
particular harm to juveniles, Brennan believed the state lacked the
power to suppress nonobscene sexually oriented materials."'
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court but be-
lieved that a more conservative statute would adequately protect
the state's interest in protecting the welfare of its children and
cause less harm to the constitutional guarantee of free expres-
601 (1973), Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) and Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-24 to -26 (1978).
105. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5084.
106. Id. at 5085.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)). Since there was no argu-
ment that the films sold by Ferber do not fall squarely within the category of activity de-
fined as unprotected, there was no need for the Court to make an independent examination
of the films to assure itself that its decision did not constitute a prohibited intrusion on the
field of free expression. Id. at 5085 n.28.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion will not be discussed because she merely reempha-
sized portions of White's opinion.
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sion." s Stevens constructed a hypothetical in which a foreign film
as a whole constituted a serious artistic work, but contained an in-
dividual scene of a child that was plainly lewd if shown in isola-
tion. Under White's opinion, Stevens argued, the New York statute
could constitutionally prohibit the distribution and exhibition of
this film because of that one scene.114 Stevens did not declare that
the New York statute was unconstitutionally overbroad but said he
would wait for a concrete factual situation, similar to his hypothet-
ical, before ruling the statute invalid due to overbreadth.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ferber can be seen as a case dealing with the definition of ob-
scenity, the power of the states, or a combination of both. The case
was argued on the obscenity issue in the New York courts. But
when the Supreme Court dealt with the case, it decided that the
case was outside of the obscenity field and analyzed it in light of
the competing individual's interest in personal freedoms and the
state's interest in protecting the welfare of children.
The Supreme Court has freed the hands of the states from the
binds of Miller to better combat child pornography and protect
the welfare of children. Could this be the beginning of the end for
nonobscene, sexually explicit materials generally receiving first
amendment protection?" 5 A state is still limited in some ways in
its fight to protect its children from sexual exploitation. 16 Balanc-
ing on the one hand the Court's recent concern for protecting free-
dom of expression, even if it involves sexually explicit material, 17
and on the other hand its long standing concern for the welfare of
children and the states' role in protecting that welfare," 8 the Fer-
ber decision does not seem to be a springboard for further inroads
into first amendment freedoms. The Court balanced the two inter-
ests and found the states' interests to be the more compelling.
As a result of the emphasis placed on child welfare balanced
against the first amendment concerns, Ferber should toll the de-
113. Id.
114. Id. See supra note 64.
115. One commentator has stated that there is a possibility that "obscenity guidelines
will follow the road of the search warrant requirement - an idealist restriction on govern-
ment power rendered lame by the myriad exceptions." Note, Child Pornography Legisla-
tion, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 543 (1979).
116. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
mise of any state child-pornography statute which prohibits the
use of persons who appear as prepubescents in nonobscene mate-
rial 19 but who have reached majority. If the statutes are intended
to protect minors from the ill effects of engaging in child pornogra-
phy, that purpose would not be served by the extended provisions
of these statutes since no minors would be involved. It therefore
would seem probable that the Court would strike down these pro-
visions as overbroad.
The most important constitutional issue about the enforcement
of child pornography statutes is in regards to material of literary,
artistic, scientific and medical importance which incorporates
within it at least one photograph of a child in violation of the ap-
plicable statute. Will the suppression of that work, merely because
of a single photograph of a child engaging in sexual conduct as de-
fined by the statute, be a serious blow to first amendment free-
doms? 120 In the words of Justice White, it is "unlikely that visual
depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting
their genitals would often constitute an important and necessary
part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work."' 1
ERIC L. DAUBER
119. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
121. 50 U.S.L.W. at 5082.
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